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Introduction 
Over roughly the last decade, most 
of the fishery resources of the contin­
ental shelf and nearshore areas of the 
world's oceans have come under the 
control of coastal nations. One conse­
quence of this extension of fisheries 
jurisdiction (EFJ) by any individual 
state has been the expansion of its pro­
duction possibilities. That is, with 
strengthened property rights in the 
ocean resources off its shores, a 
coastal nation experiences increased 
opportunities to produce goods and 
services from its newly enlarged pool 
of resources. Such a nation, then, 
would appear to be a potential gainer 
from EFJ. 
On the other hand, one would tend 
to identify as "losers" those countries 
whose distant-water fleets fished in 
those same waters prior to EFJ, espe­
cially if their access to these waters 
were restricted by the new "owners." 
Thus one would expect to see new 
production levels, new patterns of 
international trade, and new institu­
tional structures (i .e., management 
regimes, international cooperative ar­
rangements) to emerge from EFJ. In 
this paper we explore some of these 
issues from a conceptual point of view 
and briefly describe a research project 
designed to test several of the hypoth­
eses that emerge. Our theme is that 
EFJ has not only spawned new inter­
national relationships in the commer­
cial and public sectors; it has also 
provided incentives to cooperate inter-
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nationally in research activity. Fear of 
the cost of disclosing valuable infor­
mation to potential foreign competitors 
appears to be overshadowed by the 
recognition of potential benefits from 
new insights to be gained through 
shared research experience. Our 
laboratory is the world groundfish 
fishery. 
EFJ and Production Possibilities 
Consider the coastal nation that has 
declared an EFJ zone. There are two 
sources of increased production avail­
able to it. The first is associated with 
expanded production possibilities 
through increased ownership claims to 
resources. (In the parlance of the econ­
omist, this is characterized as an out­
ward shift in the production possibil­
ities frontier.) The second is through 
more efficient use of resources which, 
prior to EFJ, were characterized by 
open access, or "common property," 
conditions (Anderson, 1986). As 
suggested above, this would appear to 
be a reasonably clear-cut case of 
potential gain for the coastal state in­
itiating the EFJ zone. That is, with the 
resulting increases in output, the 
country's real income should rise. 
However, there are exceptions. The 
literature on economic growth sug­
gests that expanded production, if it is 
concentrated in a nation's export sec­
tor, may so depress the prices of the 
products whose output has been ex­
panded that the country's real income 
declines, a case of "immiserizing" 
growth (Bhagwati, 1958; Johnston and 
Siaway, 1985). While the redistribu­
tion of resources is, in itself, unlikely 
to affect total production directly, t the 
more efficient use of those resources 
afforded by new managerial authority 
could raise production sufficiently to 
induce prices to fall enough to effec­
tively convert a "gainer" country into a 
"loser" country. Whether this, in fact, 
occurs depends to a large degree on I) 
what happens to production and 2) pre­
vailing price elasticities of demand. If, 
for example, a coastal country is a net 
exporter of groundfish and faces a 
highly price-inelastic export demand, 
increased production may lead to an 
abrupt deterioration in its prevailing 
terms of trade. Knowledge of price 
elasticities of demand for groundfish 
then, is of more than passing academic 
interest in such circumstances. 
Furthermore, even if groundfish 
management in anyone country did 
not have such an impact on prices, 
effective implementation of manage­
ment measures on a global scale could 
lead to the same result, a case of 
pecuniary externalities. This raises 
additional empirical questions calling 
for resource assessment and improved 
understanding of the characteristics of 
both groundfish demand and supply 
response. For any country forecasting 
the consequences of its own manage­
ment strategies, there will also be an 
interest in the cost of management. 
Let us now turn our attention to the 
other side of this issue. That is, what 
of the impact of EFJ on a country 
whose distant-water fishing fleet~ have 
been moved away from their "tradi­
tional" fishing grounds? Here the case 
would appear to be less ambiguous. 
'If it did. a version of the "transfer problem" 
could arise. in which terms of trade are affected 
by a change in output following a transfer of 
resources from one country to another, resulting 
in adverse effects on the recipient country. For 
fishery resources this is unlikely in the short run. 
As alternative uses of the oceans are explored 
(e.g., ocean mining). this could emerge as a 
long-run consequence of EFJ. however. R. W. 
Jones. 1975 Presumption and the transfer prob­
lem. J Int. Econ. 5:263-274. 
Marine Fisheries Review 28 
Denied access to resources, such a 
country must surely experience a loss 
in real income. Even under these cir­
cumstances, however, the situation is 
far from clear. Even in the absence of 
various cooperative possibilities de­
signed to regain at least partial access 
(a topic explored in a later section of 
this paper), such a country may find 
that EFJ has actually resulted in the 
opportunity to import groundfish at a 
price below its own unit cost of pro­
duction. 2 This could result from in­
creased output accompanying manage­
ment (outlined above) and a conse­
quent decline in price. Just as growth 
may effectively work against the 
growing country, so may contraction 
actually favor the contracting country, 
although the argument is not symmet­
rical. That is, we are not suggesting 
that EFJ would lead to an increase in 
the price of groundfish, so that an ex­
porting country with fewer resources 
could be made better off. Because the 
resources are being transferred to other 
producers, prices could fall, but are 
unlikely to increase. Again, the ques­
tion calls for empirical research on 
production possibilities, demand elas­
ticities, and the trade position of the 
market participants. Growth would not 
be "immiserizing," in the sense de­
scribed above, for a coastal country 
which was a net importer of ground­
fish and which gained groundfish 
resources through EFJ. Such a country 
could always return to pre-EFJ fishing 
patterns. Similarly, a country whose 
distant-water fleets produced ground­
fish for export would not likely gain 
from forced exodus from groundfish 
resources, unless it continued to be an 
exporter and simply experienced a 
lower cost of inputs from importation 
than from own-production. 
2Perhaps as a result of a successful "infant in­
dustry" argument by the coastal state and the 
emergence of a low-cost domestic industry in 
the new EEZ. Indeed, an often overlooked di­
mension of the infant industry argument for 
short-term protection from foreign competition 
is that, if the infant matures, gains may accrue to 
countries in addition to the one protected. G. R. 
Munro. 1982. Cooperative fisheries arrange­
ments between Pacific coastal states and distant 
water nations. In H.E. English and A. Scott 
(editors), Renewable resources in the Pacific, 
Proceedings of the 12th Pacific Trade and De­
velopment Conference, 7-11 September 1981, 
Vancouver, B.C., Can. Int. Develop. Res. 
Cent., Ottawa, Ont., Can., p. 247-254. 
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From Potential to Actual Gains 
Coastal States 
In the previous section, we argued 
that there may be potential gains to 
coastal countries establishing EFJ 
zones, although there also exists the 
possibility that terms of trade effects 
convert gains into losses. Consider the 
case where real gains could be realized 
and where decision-makers have a 
number of options from which to 
choose in capturing these gains. 
Economists have explored several 
dimensions of this issue. Munro (1985) 
pointed out that, whereas sentiments a 
decade ago favored exploiting the 
resource exclusively by the fleets and 
processors of the newly endowed 
coastal nation (perhaps by phasing 
foreign distant-water fleets out of the 
coastal country's exc1usi ve economic 
zone), there is now consensus that 
some foreign participation may make 
sound economic sense to the coastal 
country, even on a long-term basis. The 
latter position rests on comparative ad­
vantage notions under which, if costs of 
production, harvesting, and/or market­
ing are lower for the distant-water 
fleet(s) than for the coastal country, 
over some range of output, all partici­
pants could gain if the coastal country 
"imported" those services in which it 
has a comparative disadvantage. 
Johnston and Wilson (1989) ex­
tended the argument to include the 
possibility that managerial services 
could be more efficiently provided by 
foreign nations than by the coastal 
state, especially if the visitor shared in 
the resulting rent and, thus, had an 
incentive to manage the resource 
optimally. As pointed out by Hemmi 
(1982), however, all such "free trade" 
arguments rest on conditions of full 
information by all parties, a point to 
which we turn below. 
Several economists have focused on 
the design of structures that will maxi­
mize net benefits to the individual 
coastal country. Chen and Hueth 
(1983:461), for example, examine the 
welfare implications of various joint 
venture arrangements in a paper "con­
cerned with determining an allocation 
which maximizes the potential eco­
nomic benefits to the U.S." 
At the conceptual level, then, some 
attention has been given to how the 
coastal country can take advantage of 
its newly-acquired resources. To quote 
Munro (1985:272), " ... if there is to 
be a distant water nation presence 
within the coastal state's EEZ over the 
long run, then it must be because it is 
in the selfish interest of the coastal 
state for there to be such a presence." 
Design of the appropriate policy calls 
for empirical estimates of costs of har­
vesting, processing, marketing, and 
management (surveillance and en­
forcement) by the coastal country, in 
order to compare these with offers to 
supply these services by foreign coun­
tries. Willingness by foreigners to pay 
for participation could be revealed by 
market devices, such as competitive 
bidding but, in their absence, can be 
estimated by empirical measures of 
demand for the products of the EFJ 
zone and potential producer surpluses 
abroad, as suggested by the work of 
Crutchfield (1983) and others. 
Distant-water Fishing Nations 
Much of the research in the public 
domain has focused on potential bene­
fits of EFJ to coastal nations. Partic­
ular emphasis has been on problems of 
realizing potential gains by developing 
nations with newly acquired coastal 
resources. Little has been said about 
the "loser" countries, whose distant­
water fleets have lost access to fishing 
grounds, and "optimal" strategies from 
their perspective. As a result, an im­
portant consequence of EFJ has been 
overlooked, as far as we can deter­
mine. Namely, while some distant­
water fleets may suffer losses in real 
income as a result of EFJ, others may 
actually realize substantial gains. 
How can this be? The answer is that 
some distant-water fleets may have 
gained from EFJ, through finding 
themselves competing in the market­
place, rather than on the ocean. That 
is, under EFJ, a distant-water fishing 
nation which previously faced the risk 
and uncertainty associated with com­
petition for an open-access resource, 
may now find that, with the extension 
of ownership control over the resource 
by a third party coastal nation, operat­
ing risks, and therefore costs, have 
been significantly diminished. Com­
petitive advantage at the negotiating 
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table may replace competitive advan­
tage on the fishing grounds. This is the 
case even in the absence of positive 
terms of trade impacts. 
It has been argued that, because of 
favorable endowments of capital and 
labor, mobility (or malleability) of 
capital, preferred access to markets, 
etc., foreign fleets may offer decided 
advantages to coastal countries with 
new exclusive economic zones (EEZ) 
(Munro, 1985). These advantages 
could be realized through various co­
operative arrangements, ranging from 
fee fishing to joint ventures. For the 
distant-water nation to be willing to 
participate in such arrangements, it 
must be to its economic advantage to 
do so. We conjecture that, where a 
distant-water fishing nation holds cost 
or market access advantages over other 
competing distant-water nations, these 
economic advantages will more likely 
be realized after EFJ than before. The 
reason for this is that, while, in the 
pre-EFJ, open access fishery, cost ad­
vantages may generate inframarginal 
rents (Copes, 1972), these rents are 
smaller than could be realized through 
successful resource management. In 
the extreme, if such management calls 
for effort restriction, the country with 
the most "efficient" distant-water fleet 
may be the only successful bidder for 
participation in the post-EFJ fishery. 
Even if it is only one of several 
distant-water participants, its share of 
the resource rent, when added to its 
inframarginal rents, could exceed its 
earlier net earnings. Whether this will 
be the case for any particular distant­
water nation is an empirical question, 
but it is significant that Japan in­
creased its landings by six percent 
between 1973 and 1985; for the Re­
public of Korea, the increase was an 
astounding 59 percent. The distant­
water fishing nations of East Ger­
many, West Germany, and the U.K. 
are among those whose total landings 
declined over this period. 
Sommer (1983), has argued that, in 
the case of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, " ... the fishing grounds of 
the high sea trawlers were mainly in 
national waters of third countries, 
which became inaccessible by the new 
law of the sea. Thus, the extension to 
200 miles and catch prohibitions have 
had greater influence on the German 
fishing fleet than on any other within 
the EEC. .. (A) reincrease of landings 
... cannot be expected, because the 
limited catch quota in the EEC fishing 
zone and successful joint ventures will 
make a further reduction of the high 
sea fishing fleet inevitable in the near 
future." (pp. 284-285). 
In the case of Korea, Rhee 
(1982:71) argued that" ... the South 
Koreans exploited the profitability that 
existed in the fishery industry because 
of low wages. As soon as the develop­
ing countries obtained access to world 
capital for securing fishing vessels and 
fishing technology, they began to 
move into distant-water fishing." Cost 
advantages enjoyed by some distant­
water fleets in the presence of open 
access conditions may have yielded 
even greater advantages during the 
post-EFJ era. 
These data mayor may not reflect 
existing or potential cost or market ad­
vantages and, thus, successful compe­
tition for access to the new EFJ zone. 
However, new cooperative arrange­
ments are unfolding, as both coastal 
and distant-water nations explore 
potential gains. 
Munro (1985:278), however, holds 
different views. He argued that, while 
there were costs associated with the 
uncertainties of competing with rival 
distant-water fleets in open access 
fisheries, " ... this has been more 
than offset by negative uncertainties 
arising from coastal state allocation 
policy." He pointed out that Japan's 
distant-water harvests fell by almost 
50 percent between 1974 and 1980, 
and suggested that the long-run viabil­
ity of contractual arrangements be­
tween coastal states and distant-water 
nations requires reinvestment in dis­
tant-water fleet capacity. His argu­
ments make sound economic sense, 
although we point out that the 
Japanese situation seems to have 
changed since 1980. Whether the eco­
nomic forces he enumerates, or those 
we suggest, prevail for any given dis­
tant-water nation can be determined 
only by empirical investigation. 
It is hardly surpnslllg that there 
exists substantial interest in economic 
analysis of demand and cost conditions 
to determine the extent of the benefits 
from such participation. Even those 
countries that have "lost" from EFJ 
may be able to reduce these losses by 
exploring the costs and benefits of 
partnership arrangements with coastal 
states. 
Americanization 
The United States extended jurisdic­
tion over the fishery resources adjacent 
to its coasts in 1976 with the passage 
of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act. Since then, 
U. S. fisheries policy has gone through 
several stages, especially with respect 
to the nature and extent of foreign vs. 
wholly domestic participation. The 
popular term for this progression 
toward exclusive domestic utilization 
of the EEZ is "Americani7ation." 
Focusing on a single example, which 
is characteristic in kind if not in scale 
in the U.S. EEZ, we may consider the 
walleye or Alaska pollock, Theragra 
chalcogramma, fishery. In the current 
stage, foreign involvement is to be 
phased out, including joint-venture 
"over-the-side" sales of Alaska pollock 
to foreign processors, and the fishery 
is to be converted to a wholly domestic 
operation at the most rapid pace possi­
ble. What are the implications of the 
argument advanced above for this ac­
celerated Americanization policy? 
Consider the data. Over 70 percent 
of foreign finfish catch in 1986 in the 
U.S. EEZ off Alaska (the Gulf of 
Alaska and, more importantly, the 
Eastern Bering Sea), was Alaska pol­
lock. The 1986 joint venture harvest of 
Alaska pollock accounted for almost 
69 percent of the joint venture landings 
in the entire U.S. EEZ. The directed 
foreign fishery catch of Alaska pollock 
in 1984 was 1. 032 million metric tons 
(t). By 1986, this had fallen to 
353,000 t. The bulk of the landings 
were by Japan, with Korea a distant 
second. The joint venture catch of 
Alaska pollock in 1986 was 904,000 t, 
more than double its 1984 level. 
Again, Japan and Korea were the lead­
ing U. S. partners, in that order. 
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As we interpret the current U.S. at­
titude, in both the public and private 
sectors, it is that the success of the 
Americanization policy will depend 
upon the ability of the U.S. industry to 
supply the important Japanese mar­
kets, especially with respect to Alaska 
pollock. If the United States displaces 
the Japanese and Korean fleets and 
processors, will it automatically 
replace these countries in their respec­
tive markets? Perhaps. But not all 
countries with new EFJ's have adopted 
the U. S. attitude toward foreign par· 
ticipation, and thus, as suggested 
above, it is not unreasonable to expect 
that Japan and Korea will seek-and 
find-opportunities elsewhere. The 
consequences for the emerging U.S. 
industry, and the nation as a whole, 
could be enormous. 
At the present time, in anticipation 
of serving these major world markets, 
the State of Alaska is aggressively pur­
suing development policies in the 
groundfish fishery off its shores, inten­
ded to induce rapid expansion of on­
shore processing capacity of ground­
fish. There are obvious short term and 
provincial reasons for Alaska to ad­
vocate this position. However, the 
evidence strongly suggests that on­
shore processing capacity, particularly 
in remote areas of Alaska which do not 
possess even the most rudimentary in­
frastructure needed to support this 
industry, may not be in the collective 
best interest of the nation, from an 
economic perspective. 
Floating capacity, capable of self­
contained mobile operation has a clear 
economic advantage in the high 
volume, relatively low unit value 
groundfish processing sector. And yet, 
significant political pressure, at vir­
tually every level of decision making, 
and financial subsidies, both Federal 
and state, disproportionately favoring 
onshore facilities, have characterized 
the development of this industry in re­
cent years. It has been suggested that 
these programs have induced the con­
struction of facilities in locations of the 
state that cannot be sustained on an 
unsubsidized joint competitive basis. 
This has already resulted in the com­
plication of fishery management allo-
51(I J, 1989 
cation decisions in the Bering Sea 
groundfish fishery, owing to the shore­
side facilities' reported inability to 
acquire raw material, i.e., groundfish, 
for processing at prices which make 
operation profitable, confronted as 
they are with competition from float­
ing capacity. 
To the extent that onshore proces­
sing development is artificially in­
duced, whether through direct subsidy 
or political manipulation of the regula­
tory environment, the resulting expan­
sion of U. S. utilization of the ground­
fish resources in the EEZ will be more 
costly than would be the case if alter­
native development strategies had 
been employed. In practice, the ex­
ercise has been instructive. It has gen­
erated new information on develop­
ment and production costs, which will 
be invaluable in assessing, in retro­
spect, the merits of the Americaniza­
tion policy to displace foreign fisheries 
and processors. But what if the 
markets, anticipated by the advocates 
of an accelerated Americanization of 
the U.S. EEZ, fail to materialize? 
After all, even in the absence of the 
Americanization policy, Japanese and 
Korean interests may better be served 
by negotiating long-term contracts 
with other coastal countries that recog­
nize the mutual benefits of such ar­
rangements. The international Organ­
ization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD, 1986: 137) has 
reported that, in addition to agree­
ments with the United States and 
Morocco, "negotiations on fishery 
agreements ... have been conducted 
by Japan with Canada, China, the 
Republic of Korea, Australia, New 
Zealand, and South Pacific coun­
tries ... The main species sought 
are squid, bottomfish, etc." This 
understates Japanese participation in 
foreign fisheries including recent 
agreements in South America, among 
others, although some setbacks have 
reportedly been experienced, espe­
cially in U.S. waters, as cited above, 
and in Soviet waters. 
Nonetheless, Japan continues to rely 
on its own fleets and processors to 
supply the domestic market,3 although 
we do not know that these new ar­
rangements are designed to substitute 
for Alaska pollock, in the large but 
declining Japanese surimi market. If 
they are, the consequences of the 
Americanization policy could be much 
different than expected. 
Cooperative Research 
It is precisely this environment of 
uncertainty that is, in our opinion, 
generating worldwide interest in co­
operative research on international 
groundfish markets. With such dra­
matic changes in ownership of the 
ocean's living marine resources, there 
are new participants in these markets, 
especially new holders of resource 
wealth. As discussed above, this had 
led to some displacement of foreign 
fishing fleets and, hence, to interest in 
how to recoup apparent losses. Coastal 
countries with new EFJ zones, but in 
large part infant commercial ground­
fish sectors, seek ways to convert 
potential to realized gains. All of this 
is being contemplated in an environ­
ment of uncertainty about I) the extent 
to which previously underutilized 
species may command economic at­
tention, 2) the nature of the market for 
the many products of the groundfish 
fishery, and 3) the benefits and costs 
associated with cooperative fishing 
and processing arrangements. 
One thing that has clearly emerged 
from this growing competition for ac­
cess to, and control over, heretofore 
undesirable or uneconomic fisheries 
resources, is the image of a highly 
integrated and interdependent world 
market for seafood, particularly white­
fish, commodities. In combination 
with declining availability of some im­
portant traditional groundfish products 
(including high valued Atlantic cod 
Gadus morhua, and haddock, 
Melanogrammus aeglefinus, fillets), 
lower valued block and minced block 
made from pollock, hakes, and any 
3T._N. Chen and D. L. Hueth. 1983.Welfare 
considerations in the development of a joint ven­
ture policy. In B. Melteff (editor), Proceedings 
of the International Seafood Trade Conference, 
8-12 September 1982, Anchorage, Alaska, p. 
461-471. Sea Grant Coli. Program, Univ. 
Alaska, Fairbanks, AK 99701. 
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number of other relatively abundant 
species, and growing worldwide de­
mand for whitefish products (including 
fresh and frozen fillets, blocks, headed 
and gutted, and surimi), prospects for 
groundfish development appear bright, 
if as of now somewhat uncertain. 
To aid in the resolution of some of 
this uncertainty regarding the antici­
pated growth in world whitefish pro­
duction and trade, an international 
cooperative study of groundfish re­
source capabilities, trade flows, prod­
uct forms, market characteristics, and 
demand was initiated in early 1987. 
The study, supported in part by the 
U.S. National Marine Fisheries Ser­
vice, is intended to provide a compre­
hensive overview of the major world­
wide groundfish resources. The study 
is designed in three phases. Phase one 
involves a global inventory of signifi­
cant unutilized and underutilized 
groundfish species. This inventory 
will seek to identify I) the species 
complex, 2) geographic distribution, 
3) total size, 4) annual harvestable sur­
plus, and 5) jurisdictional control, as­
sociated with significant populations 
which are perceived to have commer­
cial potential. 
Simultaneously, data on interna­
tional seafood trade arrangements are 
being developed. These include I) 
documentation of trade practices 
designed to establ ish and maintain 
markets, and 2) product flows in 
high-volume whitefish commodities. 
These could include indirect and direct 
subsidies, geopolitical arrangements, 
countertrading relationships, capital 
and/or technology transfers, etc. The 
purpose here is to establish a con­
textual framework for understanding 
existing seafood trade patterns and to 
assess the potential characteristics of 
future trading opportunities. Included 
in this portion of the phase-one analy­
sis is a descriptive summary of the 
existing international joint venture 
arrangements, including their number, 
the participating partner nations, 
species complex targeted, and their 
institutional configuration. 
Subsequent phases of the study will 
draw upon the data compiled in phase 
one to I) quantitatively evaluate 
supply and demand relationships for 
whitefish commodity groups in the 
world market, 2) assess the sensitivity 
of demand to variations in total world 
production, and 3) examine the in­
fluence of macroeconomic, political, 
and resource management policy on 
world groundfish trade patterns. Per­
haps the research addresses the point 
of Hemmi (1982), referred to earlier, 
about the need for full information. 
In view of the many uncertainties 
surrounding the nature of supply and 
demand conditions for groundfish, it 
is not surprising that the response to 
the call for cooperative international 
research has been so resoundingly 
positive. Apparently the expected 
benefits from the insights generated 
are perceived to exceed costs of dis­
closing proprietary information. 
Phase one of the study began in 
spring 1987 and involved more than 40 
scientists from 23 nations around the 
world. Preliminary results of this 
phase of the study were to be available 
by spring 1988, and. assuming con­
tinued funding support, phase two was 
to begin then. 
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